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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA IDA CORYELL MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14352

vs.
ALBERT E. MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce brought by Patricia Ida
Coryell Martin, Plaintiff-Respondent, against Albert E. Martin,
Defendant-Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial of the issues the Court, sitting without a
jury, granted a decree of divorce to both parties and entered
its order for division of their real, personal and business
property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent, Patricia Ida Coryell Martin, seeks
affirmance of the Lower Court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as
"Wife") and Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter referred to as
"Husband") are actual and bona fide residents of Weber County,
Utah, and were for more than three months prior to the commenceDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment of this action.

The plaintiff and defendant are husband

and wife, having been intermarried on September 18, 1964, at
Malad, Idaho.
riage, to-wit:

One child has been born as issue of this marCODY BRET MARTIN, born June 2 4, 19 74.

The

parties acquired various assets and incurred debts and obligations

during the marriage.

The trial court ordered the

division of the property and the business known as Coryell
Answering Service was awarded to the wife.

The husband was

awarded $11,000.00 for his interest in the business.

This was

to be paid within three (3) years at a rate of not less than
$500.00 per month at eight percent (8%) per annum interest on
the unpaid balance.

This lien is to be subordinate to that of

the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. H. C. Coryell.

The husband was re-

quired to pay $75.00 per month to the wife as and for child support.

The husband was not required to pay the wife alimony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ITS
DIVISION OF THE PROPERTY.
The fundamental argument advanced by the husband is that
the business assets could have been divided differently than the
method chosen by the court.

Even if the husband's assertions

were grounded, there would not be legal basis for reversal.
The rule of law is firmly established that "the trial
judge will be indulged considerable latitude of discretion in
adjusting the financial and property interest of the parties. . ."
Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d. 202, 331 P.2d. 821 (1958).
The court Digitized
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tion" as the standard for overturning the trial judgefs decision.
There is no such "clear abuse" in this case.
The court has often listed considerations that should be
taken into account when dividing the assets of a marriage upon
divorce.

Appellant at Page 7 of his brief cites Wilson v. Wilson,

5 Utah 2d. 79, 296 P.2d. 977 (1956).

Appellant omitted many of

the relevant considerations the trial judge is instructed to weigh.
For example, the court states that the object is to allow a "just
and equitable adjustment" of the property to allow the parties to
"reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful basis. In doing so, it is necessary for
the court to consider, in addition to the
relative guilt or innocence of the parties,
an appraisal of all of the attendant facts
and circumstances."
The appellant also neglected to include the following
important considerations enumerated by the court, viz.:
". . .the duration of the marriage; the ages
of the parties; their social positions and
standards of living; their health; considerations relative to children; the money and
property they possess and how it was acquired;
their capabilities and training and their
present and potential incomes.4" (emphasis added).
296 P.2d. at 979, 980.

Footnote 4 cites, "For other lists of the

factors to be considered see Pinion v. Pinion, supra [92 Utah 255
67 P.2d. 265]; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d.
1066, 1071."
It is clear that the intent and purpose of the law is to
allow the unique situation of each divorce to be considered in its
own light on its own facts and with broad deference being given to
the trial judge's discretion and judgment.
The Digitized
foregoing
considerations strongly support the trial
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

judge's discretion and judgment.
The foregoing considerations strongly support the trial
court's decision in this case.
about eleven (11) years.

The parties were married for

During most of that time the wife was

the sole or substantial financial supporter of the family.

The

standard of living enjoyed by the family was substantially the
result of the wife's productivity.

She was awarded the child.

The small amount of child support assessed against the husband
was in recognition of the mother's continuing role as a working
mother and the father's education, training, good health and
employment capability.
The major asset of the marriage was the contract of purchase of Coryell Answering Service from the wife's parents.

The

business was commenced in 1955 by her parents when the wife was
age eleven (11). Wife worked continuously with the business except for a twenty-six (26) month interval.

The sole reason the

sellers sold to the parties hereto was because of the parentdaughter relationship between the sellers and the wife.

The ac-

quisition of this asset was made possible only by the desire of
the wife's parents to keep the business in the family.
The relative capabilities of the parties was introduced
at the trial.

The wife managed and operated the business; whereas,

the husband did not participate.
very generous to the husband.

The division of property was

The type of service generates bus-

iness income in proportion to the manager's skill.

The wife is

the only one that has demonstrated such ability. Nevertheless,
the husband was awarded $11,000.00 for whatever contribution he
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

may have made to the business, to be paid at not less than $500.00
per month at eight percent (8%) per annum.

The husband is to pay

no alimony.
For the wife to maintain her standard of living and provide
for the reasonable support of their child she must continue to operate the business profitably in a very competitive and uncertain
market.
It is significant to note that at Pages 2, 3 of appellant's
brief he cites the husbandfs attainment of a degree in business
management (R-48) but at Page 15 of appellant's brief he notes
that the husband was at the time of the divorce working in construction on an hourly basis of $4.00 an hour with a maximum net
weekly income of $139.00 if fully employed (R-205).

It is appar-

ent that the husband is not utilizing his skills and training for
maximum profitability and had perpetuated the economic dependancy
upon his wife that existed during the period of the marriage (R-55,56).
At Page 3 of appellant's brief he refers to the father of
appellee as being age 75 and desirous of selling the business (R-103).
The testimony was that the father was 75 at the time of the trial.
The time of the sale of the business, July 1, 1973 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit " A " ) , the wife's father was twelve (12) years younger.
The significant date, of course, is the date of the sale not the
date of his testimony.

The wife and her father both testified

that the motivation for selling the business to the parties to
this action was the wife's training, experience and fidelity to
the business since she was age eight (8) and the trial court properly concluded that he did not believe the transaction was fully
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR,30).
may contain errors.
an arms-length transaction
(R-2

Appellant develops figures based upon the testimony of
one witness only (disregarding the other three experts who
testified) regarding hypothetical formulas that the business
could realize and how, based thereon, it should be valued.

As-

suming, without admitting, that the appellant's hypothetical
calculations have some validity, appellee submits that they are
immaterial inasmuch as the evidence that the trial court based
its judgment on is clear that the motivation for the sellers
(the wife's parents) to sell the business that they had established and built over an approximate twelve (12) year period is
that they wanted to maintain the business in the family and that
their daughter (appellee) had been trained in the business from
the time she was age eight (8). Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" reflects
that no down payment was required.

It is evident that the payments

for the purchase were to come from operating revenues.

The oper-

ating revenues were the result of the wife's, not the husband's,
entrepreneurship in managing and promoting the business.

There

is nothing in the record to show that the husband had appreciable
earnings concurrent with the wife's operation of the business
which could have been contributed to the installment payments required by Plaintiff's Exhibit "A".

Therefore, the incentive for

the sale and the accomplishment of the sale terms were the sole
and exclusive result of the wife's relationship to the sellers
and her perpetuation of her parents' business, none of which is
attributable to the husband.

Therefore, it is immaterial which

of the formulae the trial court applied in determining value.
It is apparent that the court gave some consideration to the reDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lationship between the parties hereto for whatever business or
non-business reason and made a discretionary award to the husband
in view of that.
Appellant at Pages 6, 1 of his brief advances an argument
regarding improvements to the real property and how the improvements are treated for income tax purposes.

The argument essen-

tially is one of how the tax accountant should handle the expenditures for income tax deduction purposes and not one of the
enhancement of the business property values.
Defendant's Exhibit 6 which accounts for the improvements
made on the real property by the appellant and the wife's father
(who was 75 at the time of the trial and obviously not at the time
of the improvements, for whatever significance that may hold) does
not delineate between the amounts spent for the residential area
which the husband would normally provide for a wife, and what, if
any, might properly be allocated to improvement of the business
area of the edifice.

However, this must have been a factor for

the trial judgefs $11,000.00 award to the husband, in any event.
The husband seems to argue at Page 12 of appellant's brief
that he was competent to manage the business based upon his achieving a degree in business management and having been employed as
a supervisor of a business in California (R-81).

However, there

is no testimony to show that the type of training and experience
that the husband had received was particularly qualifying for this
type of specialized service business, nor, is there any evidence
that the wife used any coercion, duress or undue influence to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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restrain the husband from participating in the business.

It is

consistent, as the wife and her father testified (R-834), that
the husband was not actively involved because he was not trained
nor qualified for this particular business enterprise.

Further-

more , it is significant that there is no evidence of appreciable
earnings from any source by the business-qualified husband from
the date of the contract (plaintiff's Exhibit "A") to the date
of the trial of this case.

There is evidence that the trial court

had substantial evidence before it to determine an equitable
division of the business assets of the parties and that an equitable
distribution was ordered by the court.

Certainly, it cannot cog-

ently be argued that the naked oral offer by the husband to the
wife to purchase the business assets is a sound basis for determining values and equitable division of the business properties
(R-211).

There is nothing in the record to show that the offeror

had the particular qualification to perpetuate this specialized
service business nor had the capability of paying the amount offered.
POINT II
THE HUSBAND SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT.
It is noteworthy that the husband argues in Point I of
his brief that he would be competent to operate this specialized
business if afforded the opportunity; however, in Point II he
states he is unable to otherwise earn more than a maximum net
weekly income of $139.00.
Even if this is an accurate indication of his earning

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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capacity, $75.00 per month would only be thirteen percent (13%)
of his monthly income.

If the $500.00 per month from his portion

of the business is included, $75.00 per month would only be
seven percent (7%) of his monthly income.

An award of $75.0 0

per month child support is clearly reasonable in the circumstances.
The appellee agrees with the case cited by appellant in
his brief and especially that the facts and circumstances in each
particular case will govern such decision.

The trial judge looked

at the totality of the circumstances of the parties and entered a
just, equitable award of child support.

It would be paternally

and socially irresponsible for a healthy and trained father to
have no responsibility for the support and maintenance of his only
child.

Of course, it is well established that child support awards

are in personam and may be reviewed by the court any time when
there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of the
parties.

It has not been argued by either party that their cir-

cumstances or the circumstances of their child has substantially
changed since the trial court entered its decree relating to child
support.
Appellant cites no authority, and appellee cannot discover
any, which holds that disparity in income precludes the father's
responsibility for assisting in the support of his children.

In

any event, an award of $75.0 0 per month for the support of their
only child is clearly only a portion of the total financial requirement for sustaining him.

Therefore, it is evident that the trial

court has pro-rated the responsibility between the parties.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
The law in Utah is well established that each property
settlement in a divorce action is to be judged on its own unique
circumstances, with broad latitude being given to the trial judge's
discretion.
The appellant has not demonstrated any persuasive legal
authority or factual circumstances that would sustain a reversal
of the trial court's judgment.

Consequently, the trial court's

judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

GLENN J. MECHAM, ESQ.
Attorney for Respondent
2 50 6 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
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N. Vlahos, Esq., Attorney for appellant, Legal Forum Building,
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March, 1976.
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